














































2. Welfare Effects of Strategic Outsourcing          
in Duopolistic Markets 






This paper shows the strategic aspects of international outsourcing in a 
duopolistic market. Due to different costs of integrated production and 
outsourcing, the choice of a firm influences the strategy of the competitor 
via the output price. Therefore, the resulting market constellation depends 
on the fixed costs and the difference between marginal costs. We show that 
the three market constellations, both firms produce integrated, both use 
outsourcing and the firms operate with different strategies are possible. Also 
the welfare effects of the different outcomes are analysed. If the optimal 
firms decision is characterized by different strategies, this constellations for 
given costs is pareto superior to a constellation with equal strategies. On the 
other hand, for given costs, a resulting constellation of equal strategies can 
be pareto inferior or pareto superior to a constellation with different 
strategies.   
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Outsourcing, i.e. the acquisition of formerly self-produced inputs from a foreign 
independent specialized supplier, is often viewed as a possibility to produce in a cheaper 
way, to cope with increasing competition due to globalization.1 The important role of 
outsourcing can be exemplified by the mobile communication and automobile industry. 
Nokia, as the leading mobile communications provider outsources 20% of its mobile 
production (Economist, 2002). For the automobile industry the Fraunhofer Institute and 
Mercer (2004) estimate that by the year 2015 automobile sub-contractors will be handling 
up to 80% of the development and production, i.e. the production stages with the highest 
fixed costs, whereas the manufacturers will focus on the post-production stage, e.g. sales, 
since investments at that stage mean higher profits with less capital input.  
As we mentioned, the main reason for outsourcing is the realization of lower costs. 
However, this can be done by two ways, lower marginal costs or lower fixed costs. While 
the first advantages can be set off against transaction costs2, for the second motive, also 
higher marginal costs are possible. In this paper we assume that outsourcing becomes 
attractive because of fixed cost saving, but is also associated with higher marginal costs 
than the domestic production. Thus we see the organizational choice as an investment 
choice, where outsourcing stands for a long-term externalization of certain production 
parts. This argument plays an important role in high-investment sectors such as the 
automobile or aircraft industries, since autonomous input suppliers can divide their fixed 
costs among various buyers, but an in-house producing company cannot. Since the 
decision concerning the production mode influences the costs and thus the market price, 
other participants in an industry are affected. The other firms will react on this effect by 
adapting the production mode and thus, the organizational choice becomes an instrument 
of strategic interaction between the participants in an industry.  
This paper analyses these strategic interactions between companies in an industry and the 
resulting production structures and their welfare implications. The starting point is a 
Cournot-duopoly with simultaneous organization choices. The following questions will be 
answered: First, how are production choices affected by the costs? Second, what effects do 
these choices have on welfare? As outsourcing prevents capital intensive fixed costs but 
also entails higher marginal costs than in-house production, the company is faced with a 
trade-off between investment costs saving and additional marginal cost payments. We 
find that relative to the costs, symmetric or asymmetric forms of production organization 
can emerge. When the marginal cost disadvantage of external procurement is sufficiently 
low (high), outsourcing (integration) becomes the dominant production structure. A 
medium level of the marginal costs disadvantage constitutes an asymmetrical 
constellation. Regarding the second question, we demonstrate via comparative statics, 
                                                          
1  The increasing tendency towards external procurement in recent years is well documented by e.g. 
Hummels et al. (1998, 2001) and Yeats (2001). 
2  The production choice is therefore made by comparing the in-house production costs with external 
procurement costs. In this case, outsourcing is explained by the transaction cost thesis (Williamson, 




whether the resulting market constellation for given costs is to be considered pareto 
superior or inferior to other constellations. We find that by decentralized choices, a 
resulting constellation in different strategies for given costs is always pareto superior to a 
strategy with equal strategies. On the other hand a resulting constellation of equal 
strategies can be pareto inferior or superior to a constellation with different strategies. 
Therefore, profit maximization behaviour by the firms does not lead in any case to the 
preferred market constellation from the welfare point of view.  
The analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 integrates the analysis with the existing 
literature. In Section 3 we introduce the basic model, in which the conditions for the 
production organization are derived. The welfare analysis of the different production 
structures is undertaken in Section 4. Finally, we sum up the results in Section 5. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The literature deals with many different strands of international outsourcing because 
there are various types (vertical or horizontal) and different definitions (make-or-buy or 
fragmentation/input trade).3 Despite the growing significance of outsourcing, the strategic 
aspect, as a reason for outsourcing has been long ignored. Only in more recent analysis 
this gap has been closed.  
To our knowledge Nickerson und Vanden Bergh (1999) are the first who discuss the 
strategic implications of organizational choices. Within a Cournot-duopoly in the output 
market, they derive the conditions for the production structure in the different Nash-
Cournot-equilibria from the trade-off of fixed cost savings against higher marginal costs in 
the presence of outsourcing. Using a Hotelling model with differentiating goods and 
simultaneous production choice procedures, Shy and Stenbacka (2003) also depict the 
organizational choices. Here, also, the structure is determined by the trade-off between 
capital intensive fixed costs and the difference in marginal costs. Thus, there are threshold 
values of the marginal cost difference against the fixed costs, which denote the production 
organization. Both papers conclude that in the case of relatively high (low) fixed costs 
and/or low (high) marginal cost differences, the firms will outsource (produce integrated). 
In the case of a medium fixed cost level and/or a medium marginal cost difference, the 
market constellation is characterized by different production structures.  
In contrast to these papers, Buehler and Haucap (2006) assume in their duopoly model a 
sequential production decision process. Other than in the above mentioned papers, the 
external procurement price is not constant, but rises with increased outsourcing. Thus, the 
choice of the first firm is strategic since it can – via the costs – influence the second 
                                                          
3  Vertical outsourcing is characterized by the fact that an input producer specializes on intermediate 
good production. In contrast, horizontal outsourcing describes the fact that firms compete in the 
output market, but produce also parts for the rival firm. In the case of the make-or-buy choice, 
transaction costs, as well as non-completed contracts and their effects on a firm’s choice, are being 
considered, see Grossman and Helpmann (2003) and McLaren (2000). However, regarding 
outsourcing as fragmentation, its effects with regard to trade models are discussed (see Jones, 2000, 




participant’s behaviour and the competition. As these companies are also faced with a 
trade-off between lower fixed costs and higher variable costs when deciding on 
outsourcing, the three constellations i) both firms use outsourcing, ii) both firms produce 
integrated or iii) different market structures occur subject to cost relations.4  
A direct influence on the competitor can also occur through horizontal outsourcing. 
Kamien et al. (1989) analyses the case of a Bertrand-duopoly, where both final good 
producers determine via price bidding, which of them can subcontract the production. 
Since only the party with the lowest bid can realize outsourcing, there is a direct effect on 
the output price, the bids and on the price competition in the final goods market. In a 
Cournot-competition with convex and asymmetrical output producer costs, Spiegel (1993) 
demonstrates that through horizontal outsourcing, production can be efficiently divided 
among the companies. Outsourcing increases the subcontractor’s costs, who thus offer less 
output, whereas the other company has fewer costs and offers a higher amount of output. 
However, the effect on the total output and the consumer price is ambiguous, so that 
when comparing the positive increase in efficiency with the effect on the consumer 
surplus, a clear welfare statement can only be derived in the case of a rising total output. 
Using a duopoly with horizontal outsourcing, Arya et al. (2008) compare the equilibria in 
Bertrand- and Cournot-competition. Since the input producer can set a high price, the 
outsourcing firm is met with higher costs and loses some of its aggressiveness on the 
Bertrand-market, which may result in a higher output price and consequently, less 
welfare than in the Cournot-competition.  
In addition, the special case of bi-sourcing (make-and-buy) and its strategic effects is 
implemented in the literature. This strand (see Du et al., 2005, 2006 as well as Beladi and 
Mukherjee, 2008) shows that the strategic effects of this type of production organization 
reduces the price for external procurement and minimize the hold-up problem between 
input supply and demand.5  
In this paper we discuss the strategic effects of vertical outsourcing of a duopoly in a 
Cournot-competition, relating to Nickerson and Vanden Bergh (1999). We will 
demonstrate the point at which a market constellation is realized. Furthermore, through 
comparative statics, we compare the welfare effects in the different market constellations. 
                                                          
4  The mentioned papers look on strategic effects of integration or separation of the input production for 
a final goods producer. However, this question can also be considered as a decision for the input 
producer. This forward integration looks on the independence of an input firm. The strategic effects 
of the integration-separation decision of an input producer in oligopolistic markets is analysed by, e.g. 
Gal-Or (1990) and Jansen (2003), which are different in the assumption about the competition in the 
final goods market and in the results they obtain. Gal-Or (1990) assumes a Bertrand-competition in 
the final market and found that all or no input producer is independent. Thus, there is, from the final 
goods producer’s point of view, no outsourcing or only outsourcing. Jansen (2003), however, assumes 
a Cournot-competition in the final goods market and showed that integrated and separated input 
producers exist at the same time.    
5  Oladi et al. (2007) analyse the effects of bi-sourcing in an international context with a rising 
production volume in each country. Thus, welfare can be positively influenced through trade 
liberalization, which is aimed at reducing outsourcing costs. Chen et al. (2004) describe the effects 




3. Basic Model 
Two identical firms – A  and B – compete on the national market. Their competition 
equals a Cournot-duopoly in homogeneous goods, where the market demand is described 
by ( )BA yybap +⋅−=  , where iy  with BAi ;=  characterizes the output of one of the 
players. The following model can be viewed as a simple description of the decision 
problem in the aircraft industry. Starting from a point up to which the component 
production is integrated, we model the organization decision for a new product with new 
components that cannot be manufactured on the existing production line.  
In both companies, the production of the output good involves an input component, 
where one unit of the input good produces one unit of the output good. Due to market 
integration, the companies can choose between in-house production or outsourcing of the 
input component to a specialized external supplier. The price for the external 
procurement of one unit of input is fixed and exogenously given by q . Alternatively, this 
component may be produced in-house and requires an investment F , which is 
interpreted as set-up costs. The marginal costs m  of the integrated production are 
constant for each unit of the produced input. Therefore, outsourcing is beneficial, as 
investment costs F  can be saved. To avoid external procurement being the dominant 
strategy, mq >  must be hold. Thus, if a domestic company chooses outsourcing, it pays a 
bonus to the external supplier for the procurement and bearing of fixed costs. 













yTC                                                          (1) 
 
The model structure is a two-stage decision problem:  
 
(I) Each company i  ( )BAi ;=  chooses external procurement respectively in-
house production, given the competitor’s choice.6  
(II) Given its own and the competitor’s production structure choice, the company 
chooses its profit maximizing output.  
 





outsourcing scenario 1 scenario 2 
in-house scenario 3 scenario 4 
 
                                                          




By modelling the company’s decision, the problem is solved via backwards induction. 
Here, the individual production structure is illustrated by the superscript indices in  for 
in-house, out  for outsourcing and outin /  for different strategies. 
  
3.1 Stage II: Output Decision 
Given the output decision and the organizational choice of the competitor, from a 
company’s profit maximization  
 ( )[ ]
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with BAi ;=  and ji ≠ , we derive for each scenario the individual reaction functions at 
the second stage.  
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with BAji ;, =  and ji ≠ .Using the reaction functions, for each case the individual 
output and the total output can be determined.  
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with BAji ;, =  and ji ≠ , while the subscript in (5) characterizes the production mode 
of the specific firm. 
To make sure that both participants stay in the market, negative output levels must be 
avoided in each market constellation. Thus, we have to calculate the requirements for 
positive output levels. Since the marginal outsourcing costs are higher than the domestic 
marginal costs, i.e. mq > , the conditions for realizing positive total and individual output 
for identical production strategies are qa >  and ma > . When these requirements are 
met, the in-house producing participant will in the case of different strategies, also offer a 
positive output level. The outsourcing firm will offer a positive output if mqqa −>− . 
Inserting the total output into the market demand, gives the market price for each 
situation as illustrated in the following table.  
 





outsourcing [ ]qap outout 2
3
1/ +=  ( )[ ]mqap outin ++=
3
1/   
in-house ( )[ ]mqap outin ++=
3
1/   [ ]map inin 2
3
1/ +=   
 
Table 2 shows that the resulting market price is positive in each constellation. Since, due 
to the linearity of demand, the parameter a  represents the maximum willingness-to-pay, 
in what follows that ap <<0  must apply. Comparing the different price levels with this 




stays below the maximum willingness-to-pay if qa > , and thereby, positive output for 
both participants under bilateral outsourcing is guaranteed. Therefore, in that market 
constellation, both firms will realize positive output and the resulting output price will 
stay below the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay.  
The same applies to a constellation with bilateral in-house production. The requirement 
for positive output, ma > , is met, since mq >  and qa >  and thus ap inin </ . 
Consequently, in this scenario, both players will offer positive outputs and the output 
price will stay below the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay. In the case of 
different production structures, ap outin </  applies, given that ( ) 2/mqa +>  holds. As 
the conditions qa >  and mq >  are defined, this requirement is always met so that also 
under different production strategies, the price stays below the maximum price the 
consumer is prepared to pay.  
 
Assumption 1: non-negative output 
We assume that mqa >>  and mqqa −>−  hold. 
 
Comparing the price levels in the different scenarios shows that in the presence of 
bilateral outsourcing the price is higher than the price in the case of bilateral in-house 
input production. The reason is that the external procurement price is made up of the 
domestic marginal costs plus a positive bonus payment. If different production structures 
are chosen, a medium price level is realized, since the price level is subject to the average 
marginal production costs. Thus, we have ininoutinoutout ppp /// >> . 
In the same way, the total output and the individual company’s output can be compared 
for the different scenarios. In the case of bilateral outsourcing, due to the higher output 
price and the decreasing market demand, the total output is smaller than when both 
companies produce in-house. When both companies use the same strategy, the firms share 
total demand in equal parts and thus also the individual output is lower in case of bilateral 
outsourcing compared to the case of bilateral in-house production. Under different 
production structures, a medium price level is achieved, which also entails a medium total 
output level. However, other than in scenario 1 and 4, the individual market shares differ 
due to the different marginal costs incurred by the organization choice. The market share 
s  of the outsourcing company is 
( ) ( )









/  and the share of the 
integrated producing firm is 
( ) ( )









/ . Thus, the participant 
who uses in-house production will have a larger market share since he benefits from the 
marginal cost advantage and is able to offer a higher output at a given market price. Since 






1 << . When the external procurement price rises, the marginal 




increase in its output and market share, while the output and market share of the 
outsourcing company decreases, i.e. 0// >∂∂ qs outinin  and 0// <∂∂ qs outinout .  
 
Proposition 1: 
a) For the prices, ininoutinoutout ppp /// >>  applies and resulting in 
outoutoutininin YYY /// >>  for the total output. 
b) For the individual output, we have outinout
outoutininoutin
in yyyy
//// >>> . 
 
3.2 Stage I: Outsourcing Decision 
The strategy, which is chosen by a company depends on the profit to be gained and on the 
difference between the fixed cost savings and the additional marginal costs through the 
bonus payment to the external supplier. The individual profits in the various scenarios are 
shown in Table 3.  
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Comparing the profits of the different scenarios allows us to derive equilibrium 
conditions, which indicate what market constellations at which point arrive at a Nash-
equilibrium. The relations derived indicate the relation between fixed costs F  and 
marginal cost disadvantage ( )mq − , i.e. the advantages and disadvantages of an external 






                                                          





a) If the fixed costs are high, respectively, the marginal cost disadvantage is small, 




4 , in a Nash-equilibrium, both companies will 
perform via outsourcing. 
b) If the fixed costs are low, respectively, the marginal cost disadvantage is high, 




4 , in a Nash-equilibrium, both companies will 
produce in an integrated production mode. 
c) If the fixed costs, respectively, the marginal cost disadvantage is of medium 








4 , then we have a Nash-
equilibrium with an asymmetrical production structure in which one company 
has an integrated input production while the other company outsource the 
input  production.  
 
Solving the first paragraph of Lemma 1, we find that both firms use outsourcing if 
 
( ) mma
Fbqq outoutcrit +−=< 4
9/ .                                                                         (6) 
 
The critical value for bilateral in-house production is obtained by the solution of the 
second paragraph of Lemma 1. Here, due to the quadratic structure, we obtain two 
solutions 
 




/ −−±+= .                                               
 
Both critical values have to fulfilled Assumption 1, which means that they have to lie in 
the interval ( )am ;  and have to be smaller than 
2
ma + .  Comparing our critical values 
with Assumption 1, we see that the bilateral integration can be observed for 
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So far, we have ensured that the individually produced output is positive and that the final 




however, these two requirements also have to ensure that the firm’s profit is strictly 
positive, as this is the criteria for staying in the market.  
Considering Table 3 and Assumption 1, we can see that in an equilibrium with bilateral 
outsourcing both participants make a positive profit for qa > . In the case of different 
strategies, Assumption 1, ( ) ( )mqqa −>− , is sufficient to provide the outsourcing 
participant with positive profits. For the in-house producing company 
( ) ( )[ ] bFmqma 92 >−+−  must apply. In a market constellation where both companies 
produce integrated, in addition to Assumption 1, ( ) bFma 92 >−  must hold. By 
comparing these restrictions, it can be seen that since mq >  applies, ( ) bFma 92 >−  
suffices. 
 
Assumption 2: non-negative profits 







Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that the three market constellations i) both use outsourcing, 
ii) both produce integrated or iii) firms use different production structures occur.  
For given domestic marginal costs, the resulting market constellation depending on the 
relation between domestic fixed costs and outsourcing price can be graphically illustrated. 
Figure 1 illustrates the possible constellations under Assumptions 1 and 2 as well as under 
Lemma 1. Also the zero profits conditions, which determine the boundary conditions for 
the validity of the model, are incorporated.  
  
Figure 1: market constellations 
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Here, since the domestic marginal costs are given, only the relation between the 
outsourcing price and fixed costs determines the constellation. By using Lemma 1, the 
fixed cost/outsourcing cost combinations characterizing the different equilibria can be 
obtained.  
A Nash-equilibrium with bilateral outsourcing, i.e. ( outout ; ), occurs when, given the 










4  follows.8 For the case 





, which is illustrated in Figure 1, the outsourcing price 
( ) 4/3maq +=  can be calculated, where there is an indifference for firm A  between 
choosing outsourcing or in-house production, given the competitor’s outsourcing choice. 




2−= , due to symmetry, for all ( ) 4/3maq +< , 
outsourcing becomes more profitable than in-house production for both participants. The 
reason is that the bonus payment to the external supplier is rather small, which means 
that the external procurement price is only slightly higher than the marginal costs of in-
house production. The fixed cost savings are in that case more significant than the 
outsourcing disadvantage. Considering Assumption 2, in Figure 1 the light shaded triangle 
above the outoutoutinin





 depicts all fixed costs and 
outsourcing price combinations of a Nash-equilibrium in which both firms choose 
outsourcing. 
If the external supplier bonus (and thus the difference between in-house marginal and 
outsourcing price) is sufficiently high so that the fixed cost savings achieved through 
outsourcing cannot compensate the higher marginal costs, both participants will choose 
in-house production. A Nash-equilibrium with bilateral in-house production, i.e. ( inin ; ), 
must fulfil outinout
inin // ΠΠ >  for firm A , given that firm B chooses the integrated 




4 . The graphic 
illustrates by the outinout
inin // ΠΠ = -curve the indifference between in-house and 
outsourcing choice for firm A , given the in-house choice by firm B . However, 
outsourcing can only be an option as long as firm A  realises non-negative profits. 
Consequently, the ininoutinout
// ΠΠ = -curve is only defined up to 0Π / =outinout , which 
corresponds with an outsourcing price of ( ) 2/maq += . In the case of higher external 
procurement prices, firm A  will definitively choose in-house production.9 Since the 
ininoutin
out
// ΠΠ = -curve stands for all fixed cost/outsourcing price combinations, where firm 
A , for the given in-house choice by firm B , is indifferent between integrated production 
and outsourcing. Thus, the area below this curve illustrates all combinations where firm 
A  (and thus both participants) produce in-house. The reason is that, based on the 
combinations on the ininoutinout
// ΠΠ = -curve, at each outsourcing price ( )( )2/; mamq +∈  
                                                          
8  For symmetry, the same calculus applies for firm B , given the outsourcing choice by firm A . Thus, 
the derived conditions apply to both participants.  
9  Since the profits are identical on the ininoutinout
// ΠΠ = -curve, 0Π / =inin  also has to apply at 0Π / =outinout . 





 and ( ) 2/maq += . Consequently, the ininoutinout // ΠΠ = -
curve ends on the intersection of the zero profit conditions  0Π / =outinout  and 0Π / =inin , with a 




and given the competitor’s in-house choice, firm A  will choose the in-house production 
if fixed costs are decreasing, as this promises higher profits than outsourcing, where the 
lower fixed costs doesn’t affect the profit.  
For an external procurement price ( )( )amaq ;2/+∈ , firm A  does not choose 
outsourcing, given the competitor’s in-house choice, since here a loss is realized. This 
results, since firm A  chooses the external procurement only if ( ) 2/maq +≤  respectively 
0Π / ≥outinout . Thus, for ( )b
maF
9
2−≥  and ( )( )amaq ;2/+∈ , both participants definitively 
produce in an integrated way. Therefore, the grey area below the ininoutinout
// ΠΠ = -curve 
and the 0Π / =inin -line indicates all combinations of fixed costs and outsourcing price for 
which a Nash-equilibrium with bilateral integrated production exists.  








4  holds, an equilibrium in different strategies, 
i.e. ( outin / ) or ( inout / ), exits. To explain this fact, we can use the former mentioned 
curves of equal profits as the basis. Since we know, that for ( ) 2/maq +>  both firms 
choose the integrated production, a constellation with different strategies can only occur 
in the interval ( )( )2/; mamq +∈ . If the fixed costs for any external procurement price in 
that interval is so high that a combination of both lies above the ininoutinout
// ΠΠ = -curve, an 
equilibrium in differing strategies exists. Here, firm A  prefers outsourcing to in-house 
production, given firm B ’s in-house choice, due to sufficiently high fixed cost savings and 
thus ininoutinout
// ΠΠ >  holds. The same occurs when using the outoutoutinin // ΠΠ = -curve as a 
basis, where firm B ’s decision to outsource the input production is given. Firm A  prefers 
in-house, if the fixed costs for any external procurement price are sufficiently low. 
Therefore, all fixed cost/external procurement price combinations with an equilibrium in 
differing strategies are shown by the white area between the outoutoutinin
// ΠΠ = -curve and 
the ininoutinout




2−= .   
 
4. Production Choice and Welfare 
We know the effects of the production structure on firm’s profit, i.e. on the supply side. 
However, the production choice also affects consumers via the price and the resulting 
output. To evaluate the effects on all participants in an economy, an indicator must be 
found that includes supply and demand. In this context, the welfare criterion is used.  
Referring to the previous analysis, the question we focus in this section is: How does the 
organizational choice affect the economy’s welfare, i.e. both sides of the market? To 
answer this, we will compare the welfare under the different market constellations to 
derive whether one production structure will be pareto superior or inferior to another if 




4.1 Welfare Indicator 
The welfare indicator used here consists of the sum of the rent, i.e. the producer profits 
and the consumer rent, where W  indicates the welfare and CS  the consumer surplus. 
For a better differentiation, again, the superscripts indicate the different constellation of 
the used production modes: i.e. inin / , outout /  or outin /  standing for bilateral in-
house production, bilateral outsourcing or different production structures.  
Using the known results for the price and output in each scenario, as well as the market 
demand, we have  
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Scenario 2 and 3: the companies use different strategies 
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Knowing the welfare levels for all constellations, we can compare them to determine 
whether for given costs another market constellation, other the existing one, is pareto 
superior and preferable, from the welfare theory point of view. 
 
4.2 Welfare Comparison 
Similarly, as in Figure 1, using equations (9) to (11), all fixed cost and outsourcing price 
combinations can be illustrated, which achieve equal welfare levels in the different 
constellations. By comparing the welfare levels, we determine the three curves 
outoutinin WW // = , outininin WW // =  and outinoutout WW // = , but also the threshold values 
at which changing the existing choice increases welfare. These values have to meet 




threshold values with the critical values (6) to (8) shows whether the resulting 
equilibrium is pareto superior or pareto inferior to other market constellations.  
 
Bilateral Outsourcing Characterizes the Market Constellation 
According to (6), ( ) mma
Fbqq outoutcrit +−=< 4
9/  defines, for given domestic marginal cost, 
the upper bound of the external procurement price, in relation to the fixed costs, at which 
a market constellation with bilateral outsourcing occurs.  
Using (9) and (10) we obtain the outsourcing price, which yields an equal welfare level in 
a constellation with bilateral outsourcing and bilateral integrated production. Solving 


















Starting from a point on this curve, we can deduce, that for given domestic marginal and 
fixed cost a lower outsourcing price leads to outoutinin WW // < . This holds, since the 
outcome in a constellation with bilateral integrated production is unaffected, but in case 
of bilateral outsourcing lower costs of external procurement increase profits and consumer 
surplus due to lower market price and higher output and therefore the associated welfare 
level increases. Thus we can conclude that ininoutout WW // >  for 1~qq <  respectively 
2~qq >  and outoutinin WW // >  for 21 ~~ qqq << . 
To derive the binding constraint, these values have to be compared to the Assumptions 1 
and 2. It is obvious that when Assumption 2 is met, only 1~q  lies in the interval ( )am ;  and 
has to be included in our analysis. Thus, a constellation with bilateral integrated 




9~ 21 −−−=> .                                                                     (12) 
 
To answer the question whether abandoning the optimally bilateral outsourcing in favour 
of bilateral in-house production leads to higher welfare, the threshold value 1~q  must be 
compared to the marginal value outoutcritq
/ . Under Assumption 2, the comparison of 
equations (6) and (12) proves that  
 












From this relationship follows, that in a Nash-equilibrium with bilateral outsourcing, i.e. 
outout
critqq
/< , welfare cannot be increased when both participants switch from outsourcing 
to in-house production. This result is intuitively, since in the case of switching the 
production mode, both firms act against their best strategies and thus their profits 
decrease as the fixed costs are not compensated by lower marginal costs. Of course, there 
is an increase in output and consumer surplus due to the lower marginal costs and 
resulting lower market price, however, due to the relative small difference between 
outsourcing costs and marginal costs of integrated production, this positive effect is not 
strong enough to compensate the firms’ losses. Theus, changing the production structure 
from bilateral outsourcing to bilateral in-house production leads to lower welfare.  
The constellations of bilateral outsourcing and different strategies can be compared in a 
similar way. Using the equations (9) and (11) we can calculate the threshold value for 
which different strategies becomes advantageous from the welfare theory point of view. 























As one can see, mq << 0ˆ2  applies and thus Assumption 1 is not fulfilled, which means 
that this threshold value can be neglected. Therefore, a constellation with different 
strategies leads to a higher welfare than a situation with bilateral outsourcing, if  
 




74ˆ 21 +−+−−=> .                                                   (13) 
 
To answer, if a change from the optimal choice of bilateral outsourcing towards a 
constellation with different strategies increases the welfare, we have to compare the 
equations (6) and (13), which yield  
 









Fbq outoutcrit =+−+−−>+−=   
 
and thus for ( )outoutcritqqq /1 ;ˆ∈  a welfare increasing change of production strategies is 
possible if, starting from a constellation with bilateral outsourcing, one firm would switch 
to an integrated production. The marginal costs of the firm that has changed its strategy 
fall, thereby reducing the average marginal costs and the market price. These effects will 
be accompanied by a rise in the total output. Since lower market price and higher output 
favour the consumer, the consumer surplus increases. Here, too however, both companies 




at constant marginal costs so that its market share falls below 50%, and the company with 
integrated production, as it acts against its best strategy for a given choice of the 
competitor. To evaluate, if it is possible, that the firm’s losses are offset by the gain of the 
consumer, we have to distinguish two cases. In the interval outoutcritqqq
/
1ˆ <<  the marginal 
costs difference is sufficiently high, so that the positive effect on the consumer surplus 
caused by a relatively large price reduction prevails and the welfare will be higher with 
different production structures. If the outsourcing price is sufficiently low and lies in the 
interval ( )1ˆ;qm , due to the relative small marginal cost difference, the negative effect on 
profits prevails and the welfare level in an asymmetrical production structure is smaller. 
We can sum up in: 
 
Proposition 2:  
If the market constellation is defined by bilateral outsourcing,  
a) for given costs, this constellation is pareto superior to a constellation with 
bilateral in-house production, 
b) the welfare level can be increased through an asymmetrical production 




1ˆ << . 
 





2−= . In this situation, both participants 
choose external procurement, if 
4
3/ maqq outoutcrit
+=≤ .  
All combinations of fixed costs and external procurement price, which lead to the same 
welfare level in a constellation with bilateral outsourcing and different production 
structures, are illustrated by the outinoutout WW // = -curve. For any combination below 
this curve, outinoutout WW // < applies, and above the curve outinoutout WW // > . This is true, 
since starting from any combination on this curve for every outsourcing price 
4
3maq +≤  
lower fixed costs implies due to a higher profit of the integrated producing firm an 
increasing welfare in different production strategies, while the welfare level in a 
constellation with bilateral outsourcing is unchanged. The analysis shows that a 
constellation with bilateral outsourcing is pareto inferior to a constellation with different 
production strategies, i.e. outinoutout WW // < , if outoutcritqqq /1ˆ <<  holds.10 This can be seen 





2−=  for ( )[ ]4/3;1ˆ maqq +∈ , all 
combinations of the outsourcing price and the assumed fixed costs lie below the 
outinoutout WW // = -curve. Consequently, the equilibrium of bilateral outsourcing in this 
                                                          
10  Given the assumption for this assumed fixed costs, we obtain for the critical welfare values 









area leads to a lower welfare level compared to a constellation with different production 
structures. Graphically, this is shown by the grey area B, which illustrates all 
combinations of fixed costs and outsourcing prices, which lead to a constellation with 
bilateral outsourcing, but yields lower welfare than a constellation with different 






2−=  and the outinoutout WW // = -curve, characterizes all 
combinations, where the resulting constellation of bilateral outsourcing leads to a higher 
welfare level than a constellation of different production structures.  
The comparison of the welfare level between the constellations of bilateral outsourcing 
and bilateral integration can be similarly described. The outoutinin WW // = -curve depicts 
all combinations of fixed costs and external procurement price with identical welfare 
levels in a constellation with bilateral outsourcing and bilateral integrated production. 
The area under this curve characterizes the combination of fixed cost and outsourcing 
price, where the integrated production leads to a higher welfare level than bilateral 
outsourcing. As we know, if 1~qq > , a change towards bilateral integration would increase 
the welfare level for changing the production structure from bilateral outsourcing to 
bilateral in-house production. This result can be explained by the huge difference of 
marginal costs. If for a given fixed cost level the marginal cost difference is sufficiently 
high, a change towards bilateral in-house production increases the consumer surplus 




1~ >  holds, which means that for given costs the welfare level cannot be increased 
if both firms change their production structure from bilateral outsourcing to bilateral 





2−= , we find that 
( ) ( ) 4/32/~ /1 maqmaaq outoutcrit +=>−−= . Thus the constellation of bilateral integration 
becomes pareto inferior if the firms choose optimally a constellation of bilateral 
outsourcing, although the consumer surplus increases due to lower marginal costs, 
respectively output price. This occurs, since the firms choose for given fixed costs the 
integrated production if the marginal costs difference is sufficiently high. However, the 
starting point is a constellation with bilateral outsourcing, and thus the marginal cost 
difference is relative small, which means that the loss of profit due to higher fixed costs 
cannot be compensated by an increase of the consumer surplus. Graphically this is 
illustrated in Figure 2, where all combinations of outsourcing prices outoutcritqq
/<  and the 















Figure 2: welfare comparison in the case of bilateral outsourcing 
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2−=  and the corresponding 
values for the outsourcing price. For lower fixed costs these values are changing, however 
the derived statements are qualitatively the same. Thus, there is in any cases the 
possibility of a higher welfare by switching from the profit maximizing constellation of 
bilateral outsourcing to the constellation with different production choices, but there will 
be no welfare gain if both firms change their production mode. 
 
Bilateral Integration Characterizes the Market Constellation 
As we know from the previous analysis, i.e. equation (7), a bilateral integrated production 
occurs, if inincritqq
/> .  
For analysing, if another market constellation as the optimal choice of bilateral in-house 
production increases the welfare level, we have to compare inincritq
/  with the threshold 
values, which indicate the equality of the welfare levels in bilateral integration and 
bilateral outsourcing, respectively the equality of the welfare levels in bilateral integration 
and different production strategies. 
From the paragraph above, we know the threshold value 1~q , which leads for given 
domestic marginal costs and fixed costs to the same welfare level in the scenarios of 
bilateral outsourcing and bilateral integration, i.e. 1~q  describes the solution of 
outoutinin WW // = . Additionally, we know that outoutinin WW // >  holds for 1~qq > . For 
given domestic costs a comparison of the two values inincritq
/ , presented in (7), and 1~q , 
presented in (12), shows that  
 













This means, that the welfare decreases if both firms use optimally the integrated 
production, i.e. qq inincrit </ , but both will switch to the external procurement of the input 
component. This result is not surprising, since a change of strategy leads to an increase in 
the average marginal costs and the market price, so that the market output falls. As a 
result, the consumer surplus falls compared to a constellation with bilateral in-house 
production. In addition, a change in the production structure entails profit losses for both 
companies as they do not pursue their best strategy. As both market sides suffer losses, 
welfare cannot be higher when both companies which formerly produced in-house, now 
procure their input goods externally.  
What happens in the case of a transition to different strategies?  
Using (10) and (11), by the outininin WW // = -curve we can illustrate all combination of 
marginal outsourcing costs and domestic fixed costs, which lead to the same welfare level 
in a situation with bilateral integrated production and a constellation in different 
strategies. Starting in a point on the curve, for given marginal costs, lower domestic fixed 
costs increases the welfare in a constellation with bilateral integrated production more 
than the welfare level in a constellation with different strategies. The reason is that the 
fixed costs affected both firms, if the constellation is characterized by bilateral integrated 
production, while in a constellation in different strategies only the integrated producing 
firm realizes this gain. Thus, if all other parameters are unchanged, the gain in the case of 
bilateral integration is higher. Therefore, we can conclude, that outininin WW // >  occurs 
for all combinations of fixed costs and outsourcing price below the outininin WW // = -
curve, while for all combinations above the outininin WW // = -curve, we have 
outininin WW // < .  


















2 −−++= ,                                                     (14b) 
 
at which the welfare level is the same when either different strategies or bilateral in-
house production strategies are used. When comparing the threshold values with the 
critical value for in-house production, 1
/ qqq inincrit <<  and qqq inincrit << 2/  must be met to 
ensure an increase in welfare when switching from a constellation with bilateral in-house 
production to one with different strategies. 





8 2−≤ . In 
connection with Assumption 2, this means that for 






8 22 −≤<−  a change 




effect. Starting in a constellation with bilateral integrated production, a change towards 
different strategies leads to a rise in the average marginal costs of production and, 
consequently, the market price. At the same time, output and consumer surplus are lower. 
This is met by an increase in the producer rent. Although the outsourcing company now 
suffers a profit loss, since its market share falls below 50%, the profit gain of the company 
that keeps on producing integrated is sufficiently high, so that there is not only a rise in 
the producer rent, but in welfare as well. This results since the fixed cost saving is high 




+<<  holds, the profit of the outsourcing firm is lower but 
still positive, while in the case of 
2
maq +>  the firm will realize negative profits. 





8 2−< . This requirement ensures that by using 
the marginal values (14a) and (14b), areas can be identified in which, from the welfare 
theory point of view it is preferable to choose a constellation with different strategies, 
although the firms will optimally decide for a integrated production. For analysing this, 






8 2−< . Comparing (14a) and (14b) with the critical value for the in-
house production, we find that 
 













qbFmamaFbmamaq inincrit =−−−+<−−−+=  
 













qbFmamaFbmamaq inincrit =−−++<−−−+= , 
 
which allows us to characterize conditions, under which a change of the production mode 
from bilateral in-house to different strategies increases the welfare. However, we have to 
compare the threshold values (14a) and (14b) with the second requirement of Assumption 
1, i.e. ( ) 2/2;1 maq +< .  Comparing the margin for positive profits in different strategies 





8 2−< , 
( ) 2/1 maq +<  applies as well. Thus, the firm, which switch to outsourcing, will still 
realize a positive profit. In contrast, ( ) 2/2 maq +<  only applies if 












5 2−<  and an external 
procurement price of aqq <<2 , a change towards different strategies increase welfare, 
but then the outsourcing participant does not gain any positive profits. At this point, the 




case, the positive profit effect of the still in-house producing participant outweighs the 
negative effects on the consumer surplus and the profit of the outsourcing company. 
Finally, we find that the welfare in different strategies is higher than in a constellation 
with bilateral integrated production if 
 
1
/ qqq inincrit <<  or aqqq inincrit <<< 2/ ,  
 
but depending on the parameter, the firm which use outsourcing can gain positive profits 
or realize a loss. We can summarize as follows: 
 
Proposition 3:  
If the market constellation is characterized by bilateral in-house production,  
a) for given costs, this constellation is pareto superior to a constellation with 
bilateral outsourcing, 
b) the welfare level can in any case be increased by an asymmetric production 






8 22 −<<− , 
c) the welfare level can be increased by an asymmetric production organization 
for 1
/ qqq inincrit <<  or
 





8 2−< . 
 





2−= , there is an 
equilibrium with full integration if ( ) 2// maqq inincrit +=> . Also, we know that bilateral 
integration leads to higher welfare as a constellation with bilateral outsourcing if qq <1~ . 
Thus 1
/ ~qqq inincrit <<  characterizes the points where the optimally production choice is 
pareto inferior to a constellation with bilateral outsourcing. Comparing the values we 
showed that inincritqq
/
1~ <  holds, which means that the optimally constellation of bilateral 
in-house production is always pareto superior to a constellation of bilateral outsourcing. 





2−=  and 
( ) 1/ ~2/ qmaqq inincrit >+=>  lie below the outoutinin WW // = -curve.  
The outininin WW // = -curve is significant for comparing the scenario with bilateral 
integration to one with different strategies, where outininin WW // >  applies for any 
combinations below this curve. As we demonstrated, there will no external procurement 






8 22 −<<− . Therefore, for this 
range of fixed costs, all combinations lie above the outininin WW // = -curve, which is 
demonstrated by the light grey area A. In this case, a transition from bilateral integration 




From the above analysis, we know that for 








5 22 −<<−  the critical value 
2q , from which a constellation with different strategies leads to higher welfare than a 
constellation with bilateral integration is smaller than ( ) 2/ma + , the point from which 
definitively bilateral integration, i.e. ( ) 2/2 maq +< . Figure 3 also illustrates this range of 





5 2−= , the threshold values for equal welfare levels are given by 




−−+= , with 21/ qqq inincrit << . Thus, we definitively obtain 





5 2−= , Figure 3 shows by the light grey area B, that for any external 
procurement price ( )21 ;qqq ∈ , the combinations are below the outininin WW // = -curve 
and thus, outininin WW // >  applies. In what follows, area B characterizes a range of 
outsourcing prices, for which a change from the optimal bilateral integration towards a 
structure with different production modes is pareto inferior.  
As Figure 3 also illustrated by the area C, for a bilateral integrated constellation with 








5 22 −<<−  there is always an interval of outsourcings prices 
( )21 ;qqq ∈  , in which range a change towards different production modes decreases the 
welfare level. However, this also means that for ( )1/ ;qqq inincrit∈  and ( )aqq ;2∈ , welfare 
can be increased by switching to different structures, as these combinations lie above the 




5 2−= , this is demonstrated by the areas D.  
 




( ) /9a-m b2















W =Win/ in out/out















5 2−= . However, similar to the paragraph above, our general 
conclusions are qualitatively unaffected by other fixed cost levels, since the changes in the 
different values do not change the order of these values. Therefore, independent of the 
fixed cost level, it is not possible to increase the welfare by changing the market 
constellation to bilateral outsourcing, if the integrated production characterizes the Nash-
equilibrium. On the other hand, under certain circumstances it is possible to generate a 
higher welfare level, if instead of optimal bilateral integration, the firms produce by using 
different strategies. 
 
Different Strategies Characterize the Market Constellation 
In our previous analysis, we already looked in part at the constellation with different 










9 2// −−−+=<<+−= .  
 
From the previous analysis, we know that for the threshold value 1ˆq , for which welfare is 
higher with different production organizations than with bilateral outsourcing, for all 
fixed costs according Assumption 3 the condition 
 











applies. Therefore, a transition to bilateral outsourcing does not increase the welfare. 
Here, too, the explanation is intuitive. The deviation of the in-house producing 
participant raises the average marginal costs and thus, the output price, which results in a 
reduction in the output amount and, consequently in a lower consumer surplus. Since the 
firm acts against its best response strategy, its profits decline. On the other hand, the 
outsourcing participant gets a higher market share and can increase its profits by 
increasing the output amount. This effect, however, does not compensate other market 
participants’ losses. Thus, welfare would be lower at bilateral outsourcing in comparison 
to a constellation in different strategies. Graphically, this was shown in Figure 2, where all 
outsourcing prices outoutcritqq




2−=  lie below the  
outinoutout WW // = -curve. 
Similarly, when the outsourcing company switches to in-house production, it acts against 
its best response strategy and loses profit. In addition, the still in-house producing 
company loses profits, as its market share falls. In contrast, the consumer surplus 
increases. However, the positive effect is not sufficient to compensate for the negative 


















qbFmamaFbmamaq inincrit =−−±+<−−−+= . 
 





5 2−= , the optimal choice of different production structures is characterized by 
inin
critqq
/< . As we can see, all combination of this given fixed cost level and outsourcing 
prices, which lead to a constellation with different strategies, are lying above the 
outininin WW // = -curve.  
 
Proposition 4:  
A market constellation characterized by asymmetric production strategies is pareto 
superior.  
 
The previous analysis allows for a simple and clear cut conclusion. If in a market of 
independent final good companies, some choose to procure their input externally while 
others produce their required input themselves, the companies act profit maximizing and 
also for the benefit of a welfare oriented institution. The reason is that, based on an 
equilibrium with unchanged costs, welfare cannot be increased by a change of production 
structure. On the other hand, in the case of identical production structures, despite the 
companies’ profit orientation, at given costs a change towards an asymmetric production 
organization may be accompanied by a gain in welfare. This may provide some leeway for 
market interference by influencing operational decisions concerning the production 
structure. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The paper’s aim was to demonstrate the strategic interactions of production organizations 
and its welfare implications in a duopoly with homogeneous goods. Outsourcing was 
interpreted as a long-term investment decision whereby fixed costs could be saved. On 
the other hand, the marginal costs of external procurement are higher than the marginal 
costs of in-house production. Consequently, the trade-off between fixed cost savings and a 
rise in marginal costs determines the company’s production choice. Thereby, with this 
decision, the cost structure as well as its market position is influenced. As this is true for 
all companies, the choice of the production organization has a strategic component. Given 
the different cost parameters, the resulting strategic interactions characterize the market 
equilibrium. Here we find for given fixed costs, that at a relatively small marginal cost 
difference, outsourcing becomes the dominant strategy, whereas at a sufficiently high 
marginal cost difference, both companies will choose in-house production. In the case of a 




Via the marginal costs, the choice of organization affects the output price and the 
consumer. Since both sides of the market, i.e. producer and consumer, are affected, we 
analysed the effects of the production choice from the welfare point of view. A 
comparison of the welfare levels of the given market structure in equal production modes 
and the constellation of different modes revealed that the optimally chosen production 
strategy is not always pareto superior. Here, we find that for a number of sufficiently big 
(small) marginal cost disadvantages of external procurement, welfare is higher in different 
strategies than in the dominant organization of bilateral outsourcing (bilateral in-house 
production). This means that for a constellation with bilateral outsourcing, the negative 
effect on firm’s profits will be offset by the increase of consumer surplus, while n the case 
of a constellation with bilateral in-house production, the profit increase of the still 
integrated producing firm will compensate the profit loss of the now outsourcing firm and 
the decrease of consumer surplus. Additionally, we find that if the firms’ profit orientation 
leads to equal production modes, for given costs, a change of the production structure by 
both firms never increase the welfare level. In contrast, in the case of a constellation with 
different production structures, the companies’ profit orientation ensures the pareto 
superiority.  
Notice, that we assume profit maximizing behaviour for the firms. Thus, there are no 
incentives for the firms to change their decisions. However, given the decisions of the 
firms, our aim is to analyse via comparative static, if profit orientation by the firms lead to 
pareto superior situations or if there is scope for interactions of a welfare interested 
government and set incentives for changing the production mode. From our analysis, we 
thus come to the conclusion that in the case of identical production strategies for given 
costs, market interference affecting the companies’ production choice may be required in 
order to increase welfare, while interferences affecting the companies’ production choice 




Nash-Equilibria of the Production Structure 
For the Nash-equilibria, the profits of a firm in the different scenarios have to be 
compared. 
 
a) bilateral outsourcing as a Nash-equilibrium  
Outsourcing is the choice of firm A  ( B ), if for a given outsourcing decision of firm B  
( A ) the profit by using the external procurement is higher than by producing integrated, 
i.e. outinin
outout // ΠΠ >  holds. Using the profit defined in Table 3, this is characterized by 








1 . For given values of a , q  and m  the condition of an 









4 .                                                                              (A.1) 
 
On the other hand, if firm B  ( A ) chooses the integrated production, the choice of firm 
A  ( B ) will be the external procurement if ininoutinout
// ΠΠ > , i.e.  









. For given values of a , q  and m  the condition of an 
advantageous external procurement is now 
 




4 .                                                                               (A.2) 
 
Comparing the conditions (A.1) and (A.2), we have, under the assumption mq > , for 
given values of the different parameters that ( ) ( )maqa −<− . From this follows, that if 
(A.1) is fulfilled, also (A.2) holds, and therefore condition (A.1) describes the constraint 
for a dominant Nash-equilibrium with bilateral outsourcing. 
 
b) bilateral in-house production as a Nash-equilibrium 
In contrast to the comparison above, firm A  ( B ) chooses the integrated production, if for 
given integrated production of firm B  ( A ), the profit with bilateral in-house production 
is bigger than in a constellation with different strategies, i.e. outinout
inin // ΠΠ > . Using the 
profit levels defined in Table 3, this condition can be written as 








−+>−− . Thus, for given values of a , q  and m  the condition 
for internal production of both firms is 
 




4 .                                                                               (A.3) 
 
However, if firm B  ( A ) chooses outsourcing, the choice of firm A  ( B ) will be the 
internal production if  outoutoutinin








−>−−+ . For given 
values of a , q  and m  this condition is fulfilled  if  
 




4 .                                                                              (A.4) 
 
As one can see, under the assumption mq > , for given values of the different parameters 
( ) ( )maqa −<−  occurs. From this follows, that if (A.3) is fulfilled, also (A.4) is met. Thus, 






c) Nash-equilibrium in different strategies 
Using (A.1) and (A.3) gives the condition of a Nash-equilibrium in different strategies, 
where we find 
 








4 .                                            (A.5) 
 
References 
Arya, A., B. Mittendorf and D. E. M. Sappington (2008): Outsourcing, Vertical 
Integration, and Price vs. Quantity Competition, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 26, 1-16.  
Beladi, H. and A. Mukherjee (2008): Strategic Bi-Sourcing, University of Nottingham, 
Discussion Paper in Economics, No. 08. 
Buehler, S. and J. Haucap (2006): Strategic Outsourcing Revisited, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 61, 325-338. 
Chen, Y., J. Ishikawa and Z. Yu (2004): Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing, 
Journal of International Economics 63, 419-436. 
Du, J., L. Yi and Z. Tao (2005): Bi-Sourcing in the Global Economy, Hongkong Institute of 
Economics and Business Strategy, Discussion Paper, No. 1152. 
Du, J., Y. Lu and Z. Tao (2006): Why do Firms Conduct Bi-Sourcing?, Economic Letters 
92, 245-249. 
Economist (2002): The Fight for Digital Dominance, 23. November, 67-69. 
Fraunhofer-Institut and Mercer Management Consulting (2004): Future Automotive 
Industry Structure (FAST) 2015 - Die neue Arbeitsteilung in der Automobilindustrie, 
VDA, Frankfurt. 
Gal-Or, E. (1990): Excessive Retailing at the Bertrand Equilibria, Canadian Journal of 
Economics 23, 294-304. 
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpmann (2003): Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry 
Equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 85-120. 
Hummels, D., D. Rapoport and K.-M. Yi (1998): Vertical Specialization and the Changing 
Nature of World Trade, Economic Policy Review 4, 79-99. 
Hummels, D., J. Ishii and K.-M. Yi (2001): The Nature and Growth of Vertical 
Specialization in World Trade, Journal of International Economics 54, 75-96. 
Jansen, J. (2003): Coexistence of Strategic Vertical Separation and Integration, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 699-716. 
Jones, R. W. (2000): Globalization and the Theory of Input Trade, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Jones, R. W. and H. Kierzkowski (2001): Globalization and the Consequences of 
International Fragmentation, in Dornbusch, R., G. Calvo und M. Obstfeld (eds.): 
Money, Factor Mobility; and Trade: The Festschrift in Honor of Robert A. Blundell, 




Kamien, M., L. Li and D. Samet (1989): Bertrand Competition with Subcontracting, RAND 
Journal of Economics 20, 553-567. 
Kohler, W. (2004): International Outsourcing and Factor Prices with Multistage 
Production, Economic Journal 114, 166-185. 
McLaren, J. (2000): Globalization and Vertical Structure, American Economic Review 90, 
1239-1254. 
Nickerson, J. A. and R. Vanden Bergh (1999): Economizing in a Context of Strategizing: 
Governance Mode Choice in Cournot Competition, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 40, 1-15. 
Oladi, R., H. Beladi and J. Gilbert (2007): Strategic International Outsourcing, Utah State 
University, Working Paper. 
Shy, O. and R. Stenbacka (2003): Strategic Outsourcing, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 50, 203-224.  
Spiegel, Y. (1993): Horizontal Subcontracting, RAND Journal of Economics 24, 570-590. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies, Free Press, New York. 
Williamson, O. E. (1986): Economic Organization, New York University Press, New York. 
Yeats, A. (2001): Just how big is Global Production Sharing?, in S. W. Arndt and H. 
Kierzkowski (eds.): Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World 







des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft  




2010/1             BÖNKE, Timm / Sebastian EICHFELDER 
                        Horizontal equity in the German tax-benefit system 
                        Economics 
 
2010/2             BECKER, Sascha / Dieter NAUTZ 
                        Inflation, Price Dispersion and Market Integration through the Lens of a Monetary  
                        Search Model 
                        Economics 
 
2010/3             CORNEO, Giacomo / Matthias KEESE / Carsten SCHRÖDER 
                        The Effect of Saving Subsidies on Household Saving 
                        Economics 
 
2010/4 BÖNKE, Timm / Carsten SCHRÖDER / Clive WERDT 
 Compiling a Harmonized Database from Germany’s 1978 to 2003  
 Sample Surveys of Income and Expenditure 
 Economics 
 
2010/5             CORNEO, Giacomo 
                        Nationalism, Cognitive Ability, and Interpersonal Relations 
                        Economics  
 
2010/6             TERVALA, Juha / Philipp ENGLER 
                        Beggar-Thyself or Beggar-Thy-Neighbour? The Welfare Effects of Monetary Policy 
                        Economics 
 
2010/7             ABBASSI, Puriya / Dieter NAUTZ 
                        Monetary Transmission Right from the Start: The (Dis)Connection Between the Money 
                        Market and the ECB’s Main Refinancing Rates 
                        Economics      
 
2010/8             GEYER, Johannes / Viktor STEINER 
                        Public pensions, changing employment patterns, and the impact of pension reforms 
                        across birth cohorts 
                        Economics 
 
2010/9             STEINER, Viktor 
                        Konsolidierung der Staatsfinanzen 
                        Economics   
 
2010/10           SELL, Sandra / Kerstin LOPATTA / Jochen HUNDSDOERFER 
                        Der Einfluss der Besteuerung auf die Rechtsformwahl 
                        FACTS 
 
2010/11           MÜLLER, Kai-Uwe / Viktor STEINER 
                        Labor Market and Income Effects of a Legal Minimum Wage in Germany 
                        Economics 
                        
2010/12            HUNDSDOERFER, Jochen / Christian SIELAFF / Kay BLAUFUS / Dirk 
                         KIESEWETTER / Joachim WEIMANN 
                         The Name Game for Contributions – Influence of Labeling and Earmarking on the  




                         FACTS     
 
2010/13            MUCHLINSKI, Elke 
                         Wie zweckmäßig ist das Vorbild der Physik für ökonomische Begriffe und Metaphern 
                         Economics  
 
2010/14            MUCHLINSKI, Elke 
                         Metaphern, Begriffe und Bedeutungen – das Beispiel internationale monetäre  
                         Institutionen 
                         Economics  
 
2010/15 DITTRICH, Marcus und Andreas Knabe 
 Wage and Employment Effects of Non-binding Minimum Wages 
 Economics 
 
2010/16 MEIER, Matthias und Ingo Weller 
 Wissensmanagement und unternehmensinterner Wissenstransfer 
 Management 
 
2010/17            NAUTZ, Dieter und Ulrike Rondorf 
                         The (In)stability of Money Demand in the Euro Area: Lessons from a Cross-Country  
                         Analysis 
                         Economics  
 
2010/18            BARTELS, Charlotte / Timm Bönke 
                         German male income volatility 1984 to 2008: Trends in permanent and transitory  
                         income components and the role of the welfare state 
                         Economics 
 
2010/19            STEINER, Viktor / Florian Wakolbinger 
                         Wage subsidies, work incentives, and the reform of the Austrian welfare system 
                         Economics 
 
2010/20            CORNEO, Giacomo 
                         Stakeholding as a New Development Strategy for Saudi Arabia 
                         Economics 
 
2010/21            UNGRUHE, Markus / Henning KREIS / Michael KLEINALTENKAMP 
                         Transaction Cost Theory Refined – Theoretical and Empirical Evidence from a 
                         Business-to-Business Marketing Perspective 
                         Marketing 
 
2010/22            POWALLA, Christian / Rudi K. F. BRESSER 
                         Performance Forecasts in Uncertain Environments: Examining the Predictive Power 
                         of the VRIO-Framework 
                         Strategic Management 
 
2010/23            KREMER, Stephanie 
                         Herding of Institutional Traders: New Evidence from Daily Data 
                         Economics 
 
2010/24            ROSTAM-AFSCHAR, Davud 
                         Entry Regulation and Entrepreneurship 
                         Economics 
 
2010/25            DECKER, Carolin / Rudi K. F. BRESSER / Thomas MELLEWIGT 
                         Strategic Or Status Quo-Preserving Business Exit: (How) Do CEO Turnover and  
                         Succession Mattter? 







2010/26            NAUTZ, Dieter / Jan SCHEITHAUER 
                         Monetary Policy Implementation and Overnight Rate Persistence 
                         Economics                         
 
2010/27            BÖRNER, Lars / John William HATFIELD 
                         The Economics of Debt Clearing Mechanisms  
                         Economics 
 
2010/28            KNABE, Andreas / Alexander PLUM 
                         Low-Wage Jobs – Stepping Stone or Poverty Trap? 
                         Economics 
 
2010/29            SCHMIDT, Sandra / Dieter NAUTZ 
                         Central Bank Communication and the Perception of Monetary Policy by  
                         Financial Market Experts 
                         Economics 
 
2010/30            BÖNKE, Timm / Nima MASSARRAT-MASHHADI / Christian SIELAFF 
                         Charitable Giving in the German Welfare State: Fiscal Incentives and Crowding Out 
                         Economics 
 
2010/31            BÖRNER, Lars / Daniel QUINT 
                         Medieval Matching Markets 
                         Economics 
 
2010/32            STEINER, Viktor 
                         Mindestlöhne, Lohnsubventionen und Einkommenssicherung im Wohlfahrtsstaat 
                         Economics 
 
2010/33            KÖNIG, Jan 
                         Outsourcing Motives, Competitiveness and Taxation 
                         Economics 
 
2010/34            KÖNIG, Jan 
                         Welfare Effects of Outsourcing in Duopolistic Markets 
                         Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
